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AT omoBiLEs-D1uTY OwEu To LiCENSEE-WILFUL INJUvY-The plaintiff's
daughter had solicited a ride in the defendant's car. The defendant was driving at the rate of forty-five to fifty miles an hour when, in attempting to pass
another automobile, he collided with it. His car skidded into a tree and the
girl was killed. Held: The duty of an operator of a car to a licensee is only to
abstain from acts wilfully injurious, and mere fast and reckless driving is not
within that class of acts unless the evidence shows that it was done with an
intent that injury result. Rose z,. Squires, 128 Atl. 88o (Sup. Ct. of N. J.,
1925).
In the Court of Errors and Appeals the judgment was affirmed, but,
because no principle of law applicable to the case received the sanction of the
majority of the court, as required in New Jersey, no opinion was given. Six
judges affirmed for the reason given by the Supreme Court. One judge argued
that the defendant, to be liable, did not have to have an intent to injure, but
thought that the facts of the case did not show the necessary wilfulness or wantonness. The five dissenting judges thought that the intention to do an act which
would probably injure, such as reckless driving, was all that was necessary.
Rose v. Squires, i33 At. 488 (N. J., 1926).
In the majority of jurisdictions the occupant of a car, whether invitee or
licensee, is owed a duty of reasonable care. But in New Jersey, by analogy
to the duties of owners of real property, the driver is held to owe a licensee only
the duty of not wilfully injuring him. Even though it be admitted that the
analogy between the duties of an owner of real and personal property is correct,' it still seems peculiar that New Jersey should go even farther than the
majority of the landowner cases and require an actual intention to injure.' The
general rule is that a landowner owes a licensee a duty to refrain from active
misconduct,' i. e., either wilfully or negligently setting some force in motion
which would injure the plaintiff.' The instant case would hold no liability for
negligence, even of the grossest kind. An act cannot be both negligent and wilful.' Thus the majority seems logically consistent. The dissenting judges,
'unson
v. Pupker, 148 N. E. 169 (Ind., 1925) ; Rappaport v. Stockdale,
16o Minn. 78, 199 N. W. 513 (1924) ; Gluck v. Bedford Co., x95 App. Div. 493,
186 N. Y. Supp. 823 (ist Dept., 1925).

'Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N. J. L. 64, io8 Atl. 862 (192o) ; Karas v. Burns
Brothers, 94 N. J. L. 59, tio AtI. 567 (ig2o).
'For the various views taken by courts in the United States on the duties
of a car driver to the occupant, see 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 86 (1925).
'The Supreme Court said: "It was never suggested that . . . (the
driver) desired or attempted to hurt his passengers....
Unless there be
a positive intent to do injury to a licensee or trespasser, no legal duty is
violated."

'Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 Law T. (N. S.) 684 (Q. B., 1862); Albert v.

City of New York, 75 App. Div. 553, 78 N. Y. Supp. 355 (ist Dept., i902);
Kay v. Pa. R. R., 65 Pa. 269 (187o).
6See Francis H. Bohlen, Duty of a Landlord Toward Tltose Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 142, 245 et seq. (i921).
'Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. R., 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 770 (1900).
"To say that an injury resulted from the negligent and wilful conduct
of another is to affirm that the same act is the result of two opposite mental
conditions, heedlessness and purpose or design." 29 Cyc. 424.
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feeling that there 5hould be liability for such reckless disregard of human life,
maintain that there can be wilful injury by mere inadvertence. In this view
they are not without respectable authority to support them.' And, moreover,
by their construction of wilfulness, they reach what is submitted to be a much
more desirable conclusion. Quad fieri debet, facile Prcsunitur.

BANKRUPTCY-AMENDMENI

OF CLAIM-DATe OF VALVATION-A

creditor

of the bankrupt filed his claim as unsecured, although at the time it was secured
by stock, then worthless. Three years later, when the stock had risen sufficiently to cover the debt to him, he attempted to amend his claim as secured,
but failed to take steps for allowance of the claim for more than five years, and
during the same time resisted a set-off claimed by the bankrupt. The creditor
asks the valuation of the stock as of the date of the amendment. Held: The
amendment of an unsecured to a secured claim is within the discretion of the
court and that discretion will not be exercised to permit speculation by a creditor
on collateral as security; and that when security has not been sold within a
reasonable time, it is to be valued as of the date of the filing of the petition.
Gardencr v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 1926).
While the object of the Bankruptcy Act is to close the estate within a
year, in certain circumstances the court will, in its discretion, allow amendment
of a claim from unsecured to secured, when the equities will not be disturbed
and the filing of the unsecured claim has been made by mistake of fact or law.
But in the principal case the court refused to grant an amendment where the
creditor with full knowledge of the facts filed his claim as unsecured, and three
years later attempted to amend, because this would allow him to speculate
without danger of loss, and would not close up the estate, and because he did
not take steps for five years after the amendment to have his security valued.
When an amendment is allowed, there is a theoretical but not practical difficulty as to the title of the security between the date of filing and the date of
amending the claim. The court further sustains its judginent against the
creditor by holding that the time of valuation of a security is the date of the
petition. This seems contrary to the decision in In re Isaacs," where the valuaTnoupsosz, N uaGEzNcx, 722 (2d ed. igoi).
"Some of the cases lay down the doctrine that an.entire absence of care
for the life, the person or the property of others, such as exhibits a conscious indifference to consequences, makes a case of constructive or legal
wilfulness, such as charges the person whose duty it was to exercise care,
with the consequences of wilful injury," citing Schumacher v. St. Louis,
etc. R. R., 39 Fed. 174 (C. C: Ark. 1889), and Overton v. Indiana, etc.,
R. R., i Ind. App. 436, 27 N. E. 651 (i8gi). Accord: Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 297, ioI N. W. 672, 69 L R. A. 6oi (i9o5).
'I

229

'Gardener v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 U . 453 (1923).
'In re Wilder, ioi Fed. 104 (S. D. N. Y. i9oo) ; In re Weaver, 144 Fed.
(N. D. Ga. 1904); Ragen v. Forbes, i Fed. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 1924);

(3d ed. 1922) 1155.
'246 Fed. 82o (C. C. A. i917); Accord: Steinhardt v. Nat Park Bank,
12o App. Div. 255, xo5 N. Y. Supp. 23 (ist dept. i9o7).
BLACK, BANKRUPTCY
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tion was as of the date of the conversion, but may with difficulty be distinguished. The principal case must be confined to the one situation where the
collateral has not been disposed of according to the terms of the pledge or
"by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation as the court may direct.""
This is in accord with the reasoning of Scxton v. Drcyfus,' which fixes the
date of the filing of the petition as the time when interest ceases to accrue on
a secured debt. But if the collateral had been disposed of by the trustee according to the terms of the pledge in a reasonable time, the reasoning of the principal case would not seem to apply, and the valuation would be as of the time of
the conversion even though the collateral had greatly risen in value.

BANKRUPTCY-PARTIAL

DiSCHARGE-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN SECUING

CRDIT-A petitioner in voluntary bankruptcy had induced a creditor bank by a

written, false, financial statement to accept new notes in exchange for notes then
due. The creditor bank's agent opposed discharge under § 14b (3) of the
Bankruptcy Act.' Hcld: Sec. 14b (3) bars the discharge only as to the claim
of the defrauded creditor. In re Weitznwn, Ii Fed. (2d) 897, 6 Am. B. R.
(N. S.) 428 (N. D. Tex. 1923).
The clause, providing that the applicant shall be discharged unless he has
obtained money or property on credit, upon a materially false statement in writing made for that purpose, has frequently been litigated. But with such certainty has it been taken for granted that it was intended to bar discharge
completely, that only once previous to the principal case has a bankrupt pressed
a court to decide the point. That single instance expressly affirmed the common understanding.' A similar problem, whether a creditor other than the
one defrauded may press the objection, has invariably been decided adversely
to the bankrupt,' the decisions being opposed only by dicta.' Even these did
not question the intention to bar the discharge completely. The authority'
cited in the principal case is dictum, and it is questionable that this court's
interpretation of it was that intended. Remington believes that "the grounds
for refusing a bankrupt's discharge should be limited to those acts which tend
to deplete the estate and to make th( discovery a! its true condition diffl.ult";
but he admits the law to be otherwise.' It is difficult to -upl t-rt the principal
case by precedent, reason, or legislative intent. Discharge is not a right, but a
'Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 56o § 57h., U. S. Comp. Stat. (1898) § 9641.
'219 U. S. 339, 345 (igx).
Accord, Merrill v. Nat. Bank, 173 U. S. 171

(1898).
232 Stat. 797 (19o3), U. S. Comp. Stat. (913)
§ 9598, amending 30 Stat.
55o (898), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1913) § 9508, and itself amended by 36 Stat.
839 (191o), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) § 9598.
'In re Miller, 192 Fed. 730, 27 Am. B. R. 6o6 (N. D. Iowa 1912).
'In re Harr, 143 Fed. 421, 16 Am. B. R. 213 (E. D. Mo. i9o6); In re
Carton, 148 Fed. 63, 17 Am. B. R. 343 (S.D. N. Y. i9o6).
'Matter of Troutman & Jesse, 251 Fed. 930, 40 Am. B. R. 418 (W. D.
Ky. 1917).
In re Morgan, 267 Fed. 959, 45 Am. B. R. 612 (C. C. A. 2d, i92o).

3

REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1915), § 2559.
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privilege granted an honest bankrupt.' That Congress intended to withhold the
privilege from the dishonest bankrupt is doubly shown by an original section
of the Act,' protecting the defrauded creditor by excepting his claim from the
discharge, and by the amendments ' which have made the clause more potenL
BiLLs

AND

'NoTms-ALTERATION

OF

INSTRUMENTS-INDORSF1EINT

OF

CR.DiT-Plaintiff held two promissory notes from the defendants, each note
secured by a distinct mortgage. These notes were indorsed by the plaintiff to a
bank. Before maturity, defendants made a partial payment on the first of these
notes, which payment was indorsed by the bank on the back thereof. Later,
the plaintiff being required to take up the notes, he crossed out the credit indorsed on the first note and placed it on the second note, because this second
note was not-so-welf secured.- Held: The erasure of the credit was not a material alteration. Harrington v. Leighton, 2o8 N. W. 219 (S. Dak., 1926).
Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of
all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsees?
The intent of the party making the alteration is immaterial, the test of materiality being whether or not the alteration makes the instrument express a contract different in legal effect from that which it originally expressed.' This
view prevails under the Negotiable Instruntnts Law. Courts have attacked this problem by inquiring whether the credit indorsed on the note is a
part of the contract evidenced by the note. In some instances, memoranda indorsed on the back of negotiable instruments were held to constitute a part
thereof. If the memorandum is on the back of the note when delivered, it is
very apt to be so construed." But courts have consistently held that the indorsement of an actual credit on a note is no part of it, and therefore its erasure,
even though fraudulent, is not a material alteration of the instrument. The
above decision is therefore in accord with the authorities. However, a con'COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 479, 480; In re Harr, In re Carton,
supra, note 3.
'30 Stat. 55o (i8gS), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1913) 1 96oi, amended by 32

Stat. 798 (1903), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1913)

§ 96oi, and by 39 Stat. 999 (1917),

U. S. Comp. Stat. (i9x8) § 96oi. Cf. COLLIER, Op. cit. supra, note 7, at 550,
and Talcott v. Friend, 179 Fed. 676, 24 Am. B. R. 7o8 (C. C. A. 7th, igog),
aff'd, 228 U. S. 27 (1913).
"Act of Igio, supra, note i; Act of May 27, 1926, Public, No. 3oz, 69th
Congress (S. io39).

IN. I. L, § 1z4.
'Benton v. Clemmons. 157 Ala. 658, 47 So. 582 (i9o8); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Martindale, 75 Kan. 142, 88 Pac. 559 (i9o7).
'Sec. 125; Keller v. State Bank, 292 Il1. 553, 127 N. E. 94 (igo); Washington Finance Corp. v. Glass, 74 Wash. 653, 134 Pac, 480 (1913).

'Washington Finance Corp. v. Glass, supra, note 3; Mertz v. Fleming, x85
Wis. 58, 2oo N. W. 655 (19z).
'Heaton v. Ainley, 1o8 Iowa 112, 78 N. W. 798 (1899); Barnard v. Gushing, 4 Metc. 230 (Mass., 1842).
'Bryan v. Dyer, 28 Il.188 (1862) ; Bank v. Hyde, 131 Mass. 77 (188);
Simms v. Paschall, 27 N. C. 276 (844).
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trary decision might have been reached by holding that part payment of the
note and its indorsement thereon operated as a proportional discharge of the
note. An erasure of the credit, by increasing the negotiability of the instrument, might be considered an alteration of the sum payable. The maker is
protected if a holder directly changes the amount. Why should not the maker
also be protected if the same result is achieved indirectly, as by erasing a credit
indorsed on the instrument?
COPYRIGHT-SUBJECT

MATTER-CoMPiLATIONS

OF

BROADCASTING

PRi-

GRAms-The plaintiffs, a broadcasting company, published a paper which included the advance daily programs for the ensuing week. These programs
gave the day and hour of each performance, the names of the artists, appropriate headings for items and translations of unfamiliar songs. The preparation,
arrangement and editing of these programs involved considerable time, skill
and expense. The defendants having copied numerous items from one of the
issues, the plaintiffs sue for infringement of copyright. Held: There is copyz:gnt in the progiams. British Broadcasting Co. v. Publishing Co., [1926]
ICh.433.
The British Copyright Act provides that copyright shall subsist in every
"original literary" work,' and includes "compilations" under "literary work."'
In finding that the programs possess literary quality the court follows the
decision of an earlier case' that "the words 'literary work' cover work which
is expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality
or style is high." The decision is based on the compilation of the advance programs rather than on a single one. English courts having held from time to
time that there can be copyright in bare lists if they are useful,' the court in
this case was only obliged to apply settled law to an entirely new set of facts.
Substantially the same productions may be copyrighted in the United States as
in England. The United States Copyright Act provides in very broad language that the works for which copyright may be secured shall include "all
the writings of an author." ' Among the classes mentioned as being entitled to
copyright are "books, including . . . directories and other compilations." '
In one of the latest decisions " it is decided that the right to copyright shall not
depend on literary skill or on anything more than industrious collection. Earlier
cases have held that a compilation comprising lists of race horses was the
N. I. L.,

§ 125.

1(1911) 1&2Geo. Vc.46§ I (i).
']bid., § 35 (1).
'Univ. of London Press v. Univ. Tutorial Press, [I916] 2 Ch. 6oi.
'Collis v. Cater, [i898] 78 L. T. 613 (Chemist's Catalogue of Drugs);
Weatherby v. Internat. Horse Agency, [191o] 2 Ch. 297 (Stud Book List of
Mares and Stallions).
'35 Stat. io75 (i9o9), U. S. Comp. Stat. (gx98) § 9520.
'Ibid., § 9521.
'Publication Co. v. Keystone Co., 281 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) (Compilation of Trade Marks).
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In view of these facts and the generality and
proper subject of copyrigh.
elasticity of the terms used in the statute, it would appear that the programs
involved in the principal case would probably be held to come under the protection of the United States Copyright Law, should the question arise here.
EASEMENTS-Im PIsm GP.qT-APPARENT UsER-The plaintiff, the grantee
of the dominant tenement, claimed an easement to draw water in buckets
from a spring on the servient tenement. The plainitff is the daughter-in-law of
her grantor, who originally owned both tenements, and knows that for thirty
years prior the inhabitants of the lot granted her have been exercising the
user claimed. Held: There was no implied grant of an easement. Kelly r.
Nagle, x32 Ad. 587 (Md. 1926).
There is an implied grant of a quasi easement which is apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary.' "Apparent," 'in this sense, is generally used
to mean capable of being seen or known on careful inspection,' but it is not
necessary that the easement be actually seen. In other words, a constructive
notice, or constructive sight, of a quasi easement has been held sufficient. In the
principal case the user left ho mark or indication on the servient tenement,
nor would its existence be revealed to a prospective purchasr by a careful
examination of the land. For these reasons the user was held not to meet the
requirement that it be "apparent," although the court found it to be "continuous." The facts tend to the conclusion that here the prospective purchaser, who was the daughter-in-law of the grantor, had actual knowledge of
the existence of the quasi easement, and of its use for thirty years previous.
This presents an interesting question: Shiould a purchaser with constructive
notice be placed in a better position than a purchaser who at the time of the
sale had actual knowledge of the quasi easement? Quasi easements pass by implication, because the courts assume that apparent easements and privileges are taken into consideration when the price is agreed upon, and that
the use of them is paid for. And this assumption is a reasonable one. It is
submitted, however, that the situation in which the prospective purchaser has
actual knowledge of the quasi easement, though it is not apparent, justifies
the same assumption. If a grantee is assumed to have paid for the use of a
quasi easement because an inspection at the time of the purchase would have
revealed it, surely another grantee should be assumed to have paid for a user
which he knew existed at the time of the purchase. No case has been found upholding the implied grant of a quasi easement which was not apparent, but it is
interesting to note an English case indicating that the surrounding circum'American Trotting Register v. Gocher, 70 Fed. 237 (C. C. Ohio, 1895);
Egbert v. Greenberg, ioo Fed. 447 (C. C. Calif., ppoo).

' Eliason v. Grove, 85 Md. 215, 36 Adt. 844 (1897) ; 19 C. J. 914.
'Fetters v. Humphreys, 18 N. J. Eq. 26o (1867) ; Richardson v. Internat.
Pottery Co., 63 N. J. L. 48, 43 At. 692 (1899) ; i TiFFANy, REAL PROPERTY
(1st Ed. 1903) 7o6.
' See P er v. Carter, i H. & N. g16 (Eng., 1857) ; Toothe v. Brice, 5o N.

J. Eq. 589, 599, 25 Adt. 182, i87, 188 (1892) ; Larsen v. Petersen, 53 N. J. Eq.
88, 93, 94, 3o AtI. io94, io96, io97 (1895) ; Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 5o5

(i86o).
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stances known to both parties at the time of the purchase must also be considered in determining whether there is or is not an implied grant.4 Still another
decision recognizes the principle that the reasonable expectation of the grantee,
as shown by the circumstances known to him, must be considered in determining the existence of an implied grant
EVlDENCE-PRESEUmPTIOxS--LAPsE Or TimE-Independent of the statutes
of limitations, it is a principle of the common law, that any debt, due and unclaimed and without recognition for twenty years is presumed to have been
paid.! The time in some jurisdictions has been reduced to sixteen,' fifteen,' or
ten' years. The statute of limitations, which presupposes an established substantive right but forbids its enforcement by the courts, is pleaded as a defence
by the defendants. It is a positive rule of law barring the action, to which
there is no rebuttal.' The presumption of payment arising from lapse of time
is drawn from the plaintiff's own case. It is a presumption of law and has
this effect: "It prima facie obliterates the debt and the onus of proof is upon
the creditor, not to establish a new contract, as in the case where a debt is
barred by tl-e statute of limitations, but to show that the payment of the debt
has not been made." ' Numerous statutes of limitations have reduced the occasion for invoking the presumption, but it is still applied to those cases where for
some reason the statute does not run against a debt.
A lapse of time less than that required by the common law rule of itself
never gives rise to the presumption of payment t But where there are other circumstances accompanying such a lapse of time, which tend to show that the
debt would, in the ordinary course of human affairs, have been paid-such as
the indigent circumstances of the obligee taken together with the easy and solvent circumstances of the obligor-the evidence may be admitted to prove the
payment of the debt circumstantially.! This evidence does not give rise to a
piesumption of law. The effect of such evidence is that the jury "is given
'Cf. Quicke v. Chapman, [19o3] i Ch. 659, 671.
*B., D., & D. B. Co. v. Ross, 38 Ch. D. i95, 307 (Eng., 1888) ; Godwin v.
Schweppes, [io2] i Ch. 926, 933.
Carpenter v. Tucker, i Ch. Rep. 78 (Eng., 1715) (though reported at this
late date, was rendered in 1633) ; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United
States, zo
-. Fed. 903 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917). The presumption is applied against
the state as well as the individual; Gilmore v. Alexander, ,68 Pa. 415, 112
Ad. 9 (1920) ; 70 U. or PA. L. REv. 30 (1922); collected cases in note to
66 Am. St. Rep. 879 (1898).
'Atkin-,on v. Dance, 9 Yerg. 424 (Tenm. i8M).
'Smith v. Niagara Ins. Co., 60 Vt. 682, if AUt. 353 (1888).
' Hall v. Gibbs, 87 N. C. 4 (1882).
'Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, supra, note 1, at 908:
"When the statute of limitations is interposed as a defense, the question of payment becomes of no importance; the plaintiff cannot recover, although it may be
certain he has not been paid."
"Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 6xi, i5 At. 42 (x888).
'Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. 463, 41 AUt. 613 (1898).
'Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. A 17 Atl. 753 (1889).
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permission to make the inference, in the light of all the proved facts that the
debt is paid."' This permissive inference is by some courts called a presumption of fact, and it should not be confused with the presumption of payment
arising out of a lapsc of time, which is a mandatory presumption of law."
GUARANTY-BANKR'PTCY

OF DEBToR-DUTY OF GITARANTEE-The defend-

ant conditionally guaranteed purchases that A might make, up to $2oo. A went
into bankruptcy and the plaintiff, the guarantee, did not file proof of claim in
bankruptcy court but sued the guarantor instead. Hcld: It was not necessary for
the plaintiff to file proof of claim in bankruptcy in order to fulfill his duty to be
"duly diligent" in attempting to collect his claim from the principal debtor.
Beitlcr z. Rudkin, 133 Adt. 214 (Conn., 1926).
The authorities are divided into two schools .of thought as to the meaning
of the term "duly diligent" when the debtor is insolvent. The minority view
holds that it is necessary for the guarantee to exhaust every legal remedy possible before the conditional guarantor is liable, even though the debtor is insolvent, on the theory that it is a condition precedent to the guarantor's obligation
The majority view is that it is not necessary to bring suit against an
insolvent debtor, on the theory that suit would be fruitless and a needless expense to the guarantee. While filing proof of claim in bankruptcy court is not
so burdensome as bringing suit, and while it does offer a comparatively easy
means for collecting in many instances part of the claim, yet, it is submitted
that, in accordance with courts following the majority view, there should be
no duty on the guarantee so to do. His duty to the guarantor arises out of the
contract of guaranty and unless the contract stipulates that the guarantee must
pursue every legal remedy possible," there is no duty on the guarantee to minimize the debt.4 Nor is there any duty on the guarantee to sue the principal
'Bean

§§ 83, 119;

v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381 (1884); I ELLIOT, EVIDENCE (1904),
STEVENS, EVIDENCE (ioth ed. 1922) 161: "A preiumption of fact

is simply an argument."
' "The presumption has a technical force or weight, and the jury in absence of sufficient proof to overcome it, should find according to the presumption; but in the case of a mere inference, there is no technical force attached
to it.

.

.

.

An inference is nothing more than a permissible deduction

from evidence, while a presumption is compulsory, and cannot be disregarded
by the jury." Walker, I., in Codgell v. R. R. Co., 132 N. C. 852, 44 S. E.
618 (i9O3). See also Thompson v. Larsen, 247 Pac. 141 (Ore., x926) ; THAYER,
PRELIMINARY TREArxSE ON EvIDENCE (1898) 339 et seq.
1

Bosman v. Akeley, 39 Mich. 710 (1878) ; Central Investment Co. v. Miles,
s6 Neb. 272, 76 N. W. 566 (i88); Mosier v. Woful, 56 Barb. So (N. Y., 1878).
*Allen v. Rundle, So Conn. 9 (1882); Nance v. Winship Mach. Co., 94
Ga. 649, 2! S.E. 9ox (1894) ; Sanford v. Allen, I Cush. 473 (Mass., x848) ;
Osborne v. Thompson, 36 Minn. 528, 33 N. W. I (1887); Wheeler v. Drake,
129 Mo. App. 547, 107 S. W. 1105 (x9o8) ; Stone v. Rockefeller, 29 Ohio, 625
(1876); Woods v. Sherman, 71 Pa. ioo (18;2); Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, =o
Pa. 36o, 69 At. 813 (Io8); Bull v. Bliss, 3o Vt. 127 (1857).
"Eddy v. Stanton, 21 Wend. 255 (N. Y., 1839) ; Allen v. Rundle, supra,
note 2.

'Nat'l Loan & Bldg. Society v. Lichtenwalner, ioo Pa. ioo (1883).
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debtor when the latter is able to pay only part of the claim.' It therefore follows that as the law does not impose any duty in those cases, neither should it
impose such a duty in the case of bankruptcy proceedings, and so proof' of
claim would not need to be filed in bankruptcy court. A recent Wisconsin case,
on facts analogous to the instant case, except that the debtor went into receivership instead of bankruptcy, held that it was necessary for the guarantee
to pursue his claim in the receivership to be "duly diligent." * The cases are,
however, distinguishable on their facts alone, without taking into consideration
the fact that Wisconsin holds to the minority view. Bankruptcy involves insolvency, whereas a firm perfectly solvent may be in the hands of the receivers due to lack of liquid assets. These two cases taken together show to
what extent their respective jurisdictions will go in construing the meaning of
"due diligence."
LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-IMPLIED

COVENANT-USE

OF

PREXIS.s--De-

fendant was the lessee for a term of years of plaintiff's premises. The lease
contained, inter alia, the customary forfeiture clause but was silent as to the
use of the premises. Defendant paid his rent according to contract but never
occupied the premises and plaintiff now sues to have the lease cancelled on the
ground that the premises have fallen out of repair and become uninsurable. Held:
An implied covenant exists on the part of the lessee to use the premises for
some lawful purpose to which they are adapted and upon failure to do so, he
forfeits his lease. Asling v. McAllister-Fitzgerald Lumber Co., 244 Pac. 16
(Kan., 1926).
There is some diversity of opinion as to whether there is a duty upon a
lessee to use leased premises. It has recently been held that there is no such
obligation! Where, under this view, a lease is silent as to the use of the premises, the lessee has the right to use the demised premises for whatever purposes
lie likes, provided they are not illegal or immoral and do not create a nuisance.
It Nould therefore appear that the lessee has the right to leave the premises
unoccupitd as long as he pays the rent according to contract.' Most courts are
i ery reluctant to enforce forfeitures, especially for waste,' or for the breach
of an implied covenant, the only available remedy being an action for damages.'
The dissenting opinion in the principal case held that there was no implied obli'Gillespie v. Wheeler, 46 Conn. 410 (x878).
'McIntyre v. McGovern, i85 Wis. 29o, 2o1 N. W.
L. Rav. 387 (1925).
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(1924);
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Benson v. Sauris, 204 S. W. 550 (Mo. App., 1918); Burdick v. Fuller,
i99 App. Div. 94. 191 N. Y. Supp. 442 (3d Dept. 1921). Contra: Nave v.
Berry, 22 Ala. .382 (1853).
'Rockwell v. Eiler's Music House, 67 Wash. 478, 122 Pac. 12 (1912);
REDMAN, LANDLORD AND TENANT (7th ed. 1920) 362.
'Cf. United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53 (1876) ; I TIFFANY, LANDLORD
(1910) 727.
"TIFFANY, ibid. 736.

AND TENANT

'Semiday v. Central Aguirre Co., 239 Fed. 61o (C. C. A. 1st, 1917) ; Stoddard v. Illinois Imp. & Ballast Co., 205 Ill.
App. 258 (1917) ; Homet v. Singer,
35 Pa. Super. 491 (19o8).
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gation on the part of the lessee to occupy the premises. To imply a covenant
and then to use a breach of it as sufficient to work a forfeiture seems rather
drastic. It is submitted that the dissenting opinion, representing the weight of
authority, is preferable.
NEGJGENC-FAILX'RE To COMPLY WITH LicENSING STATLTE-The plaintiff sued to recover for damages to his motorbus, caused by the negligence of
the defendant's motorman. The bus was operated without a franchise under
an invalid permit issued by the Department of Plant and Structures of New
York City. Held: The operation of the bus without authority was a concurring

cause of the collision with the street car, precluding recovery.

Klinkenstein v.

Third Avenue Railroad Co., 216 App. Div. 187, 214 N. Y. Supp. 725 (ist Dept.
1926).

The principal case seems to run contrary to the usual principles of tort
law. The almost universal rule in cases analogous to this is that the mere
violation of a statutory duty, such as neglect to procure a license for the driver,"
or for the car,' will not constitute a defense unless it is in fact the efficient
cause of the injury. Pennsylvania is in accord with this view,' and the opposed
Massachusetts ruling may be traced to the peculiar construction of the statute
in that state' on the registration of vehicles, which makes of the offender a
practical outlaw. The court in the principal case bases its holding on the fact
that the bus was a public nuisance, and a trespasser on the highway. While,
however, a trespasser is offered no primary protection, there is a duty of care
owed to a known trespasser not to injure him by any positive act. In any
event, the analogy does not hold good here, as the case involves no trespass toward the defendant. The latter, as a third party, cannot claim the immunity
afforded to landowners. It is submitted that the decision marks an unwise
'Page v. Mayors, 191 Calif. 263, 216 Pac. 31 (1923); Moyer v. Walden
W. Shaw Livery Co., 20o5 Ill. App. 273 (1916) ; Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725,
i88 S. W. 86x (1916).
'Whitworth v. Jones, 58 Calif. App. 492, 209 Pac. 6o (1922); Gilman v.
Central Vermont R. R., 93 Vt. 340, io7 At]. 122, 16 A. L R. xioS, note (i919).
Contra: Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry., 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25 (1909).
New York in the past has applied the majority test in regard to suits brought
by drivers who at the time of the accident were in illegal operation of their car.
Clark v. Doolittle. 2o5 App. Div. 697, i99 N. Y. Supp. 814 (4th Dept. 1923);
Hall v. Heep, 216 App. Div. 149, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 474 (4th Dept. 1924). It
is interesting to note that one judge in the Appellate Term of the New York
Supreme Court has recently allowed recovery on facts identical with those in
the principal case. Churchill, I., in Audubon Transp. Co. v. Yonkers R. R.,
126 Misc. 18o, 212 N. Y. Supp. 684 (Sup. Ct. December i925). The decision in
question is at present on the Fall Calendar of the Appellate Division.
'Mcllhenny v. Baker, 63 Pa. Super. 385 (i916); Williams v. D'Amico, 78
Pa. Super. 577. (1922).
"Mass. Rev. Laws (igio) c. 54 § 3.
'Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry., supra, note 2.
*Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 80 N. W. 117 (7899); Walsh v.
Pittsburgh Rys., 221 Pa. 463, 7o At. 826 (19o8). Contra: Hoberg v. Collins &
Co., So N. J. L 425, 78 At. 166 (igio).
'Guinn v. Delaware Tel. Co., 72 N. J. L. 276, 62 At. 412 (9o5);
v. Media Elec. Co., 2o8 Pa. 403, 57 Ad. 833 (1904).
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departure. It would seem a reckless step to exclude one who has simply neglected to secure a franchise from the protection of the law, and at the same
time to relieve the defendant of his duty of care toward one of whose presence
he is aware and of whose fault he can have no suspicion. To hold in effect that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent is utterly to confound the distinction
between a condition and a cause.
TRUST DEED-PROBATE AS \\1LL-AN-ImUS TESTANDi-The deceased, a
practicing attorney, executed simultaneously a will and a trust instrument, the
latter drawn in the form of a deed, operating in prtrsenti and witnessed by two
persons two days after its execution. The trust deed, after reserving the power
of revocation to the settlor, provided that the interest of the trust fund be paid
the settlor during his life and the principal be paid to designated persons, upon
his decease. The settlor exercised the power of revocation by adding five beneficiaries and cancelling one gift made in the original trust deed. The residuary
clause of the will provided that the residue of the testator's estate be added to
the principal of the trust fund and be distributed to the same persons and in the
same proportions as the principal of the trust fund. In an independent action
in the Federal Court' probate of the residuary clause had been refused, it being
argued by that Court that this clause caused the real disposition of the property to be made by the trust deed, an instrument not executed according to the
Statute of Wills. The residuary legatees then brought the principal case in
which probate of the trust instrument as a part of the will was sought. Held:
The residuary clause be given effect by the probate of the trust deed as a part
of the will. Merrill v. Boal, x32 At. 721 (R. I., x926).
The contradictory holdings of the courts in the principal case and in the
other cases involving these same instruments, can not be supported or explained
on any logical grounds. It had been previously decided in Atwood v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co! that gifts having been made to persons through the
exercise of the power of revocation in the trust deed, without the formalities
required by the Statute of Wills, the trust instrument was not validly executed
as a will. But the court in the principal case probates as a will this same trust
instrument. If it was justified in so doing, a fortiori, the Federal Court erred
in refusing probate to the residuary clause.
Even if the court in the principal case is correct in its conclusion that the
trust deed satisfied the statutory formalities of a will, it can not operate as a
will unless executed with animus testandi." The same court that decided the
principal case held in the connected case of Datis v. Manson' that the trust deed
was not so executed. To determine whether the court was justified in reversing
itself, it is necessary to examine the form and terms of the instrument the
'Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. ist,
1921).
'Ibid.
'In re Meade's Estate, is8 Calif. 428, 5o Pac. 541 (1897) ; Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 72 N. E. 499 (19o4).
4 io
Atd. 714 (R. I., 1918).
"Seay v. Huggins, 194 Ala. 496, 70 So. 113 (1915) ; Fellbush v. Fellbush,
216 Pa. 141, 65 Ad. 2,8 (9o6).
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situation of the parties,* as well as to ascertain whether the instrument was
capable of operating in any other way than as a will, since some courts presume
the existence of animus testandi under those conditions.! Applying these rules
of construction to the facts of the case, the necessary conclusion is that the
trust deed was not executed animus testandi. Neither the form nor the terms
of the trust instrument, nor the surrounding circumstances, warrants such a conclusion. Moreover, the trust deed being a perfectly valid instrument, its probate as a will can not be supported on the basis of its incapability to operate in
any manner, if not as a will. Furthermore, the holding results in a legally
untenable situation in that it causes the trust deed to have present operation
over res in the hands of the trustees and testamentary effect over property never
delivered to the trustees,' nor mentioned in the trust agreement.? The Court's
holding is undoubtedly due to a desire to give effect to the intention of the
testator, ineffectually expressed in the residuary clause. It is submitted that,
by making this intent controlling, a result has been reached which is contrary
to the law and to the intent of the testator in executing the trust deed.
WASTING

ASSETS

CORPORATIONS-PRFERED

CAPITAL ASSETS-PROFITS AND

STOCKHOLDERS'

RIGHTS-

SUaRLUs-The defendant, a Delaware corpora-

tion, was engaged in the mining and smelting of mineral ores.

The complain-

ants, as preferred stockholders, filed a bill for an injunction to restrain the
payment of a dividend on the common stock, contending that, as a wasting asset
corporation, the capital assets of the defendant were depleted and no provision
had been made for capital replenishment, in order that the preferred stock might
be paid off in the event of liquidation. The Delaware corporation law 3 provides that dividends must be declared from surplus or net profits. Held: There
were no net profits or surplus within the meaning of the act. Wittenberg v.
Federal Mining and Smelting Co., 133 Ad. 48 (Del., 1926).
It is well settled that the ordinary business corporation cannot lawfully
declare dividends out of its capital, and thereby reduce the same, or out of
assets which are needed to pay the corporate debts. In many jurisdictions this
rule is covered by statute.' There is great lack of unanimity among the cases
'Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 11o, 5 So. 497 (1888); Milan v. Stanley, 33 Ky.
783, I1 S. W. 296 (9o8).
'Barnewall v. Murrell, io8 Ala. 366, 18 So. 81 (1895); In re Kennedy,
159 Mich. 548, 124 N. W. 506 (igio).
'Brown v. Spohr, i8o N. Y. 2o, 73 N. F. 14 (i904); Talbot v. Talbot,
32 R. I. 72, 78 At. 535 (ig9!).

' Kennebrew v. Kennebrew, 35 Ala. 628 (x86o) ; Robinson v. Schly, 6 Ga.
515 (1849); Powers v. Scharling, 64 Kan. 339, 67 Pac. 820 (x9oa).
'Del. Rev. Code (9xg5), §§ 1948, 1949; 29 Del. Laws (1g1), c. 113, 1 7.
2Ibid.
'Mobile Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 496 (1893) ; Roberts v. RobertsWicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (i9o6) ; Loan Society v. Eavenson, 248
Pa. 407, 94 At. 121 (1915). See REImaT
PRoFITs, DIvIDNDs AND THE LAw
(1926) 32 III.

'Del. Rev. Code (15),

§ 1949; N. J. Comp. Stat (191o),

1913, P. L. 336, Pa. Stat. (192), § 5786.

617; Act of
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in the interpretation of the words "surplus," "net profits," and "net income."'
But with regard to "wasting asset" corporations, in the leading case of Lee v.
Neuchatel,* which has been frequently cited with approval in England' and
this country, it was said that "although the property (an asphalt concession)
was a wasting property, there was no obligation to make any provision for
However, no depreciation or loss of capital assets was proved,
depreciation."'
nor were there relative rights of two classes of stockholders involved, as in
the instant case. In one of the earliest American cases dealing with this question,' it was laid down that a wasting asset corporation "is not deemed to have
divided its capital merely because it has distributed the net proceeds of its mining operations, although the necessary result is that so much has been extracted
from the substance of the estate."" It was well pointed out by the Chancellor
in the principal case, that in none of the cases cited by the defendant" were

the facts identical with those of the case under discussion. Although their doctrine on its face seems opposed, yet in none of them was a depletion of capital
assets actually shown, nor was the question one of relative rights of preferred
And in the taxation cases," in which, too, stockand common stockholders.
holders' relative rights were in no wise involved, it has been held that for purposes of taxation, "depreciation" does not include the depletion of capital assets
due to extracting ores." However, in the Income Tax Law of x196,1 and in
the Excise Tax Law,' "reasonable allowance" is made in the case of mines for
depletion thereof.5 In its interpretation of "net profits or surplus" in the
principal case, it is submitted that the Court decided upon the plainest principles
of just and fair dealing among the stockholders. Nor can it be said, in spite
of the dicta of the leading case' and the deserved repute of the text-writers
'Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 692, 69 Atl. io4
(igo8) ; Hyams v. Old Dominion etc. Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 3o7, 91 Atl. io69 (1913);
Hutchison v. Curtis, 45 Misc. 484, 92 N. Y. Supp. 70 (1o4).
'4 Ch. Div. x (Eng., 1889). See Rxrr, op. cit., supra, note 3, at 38.
'Verner v. General Commercial Trust, [1894] 2 Ch. 239; Ammonia Soda
Co. v. Cla'.'berlain, [igi8] i Ch. a66; Lawrence v. Ry., [1918] 2 Ch. 250.
'But !te Dovey v. Cory, [igoi] A. C. 477; Bond v. Haernatite Co, [19o2]
I Ch. 353; P.LMPrt E.nc.zsi COMPANY LAW (iLth ed., 1924) 227.

'Excelsior Co. v. Pierce, 9o Cal. 131, 27 Pac. 44 (x89).
" Cf. Mel!on v.Glass Co., 77 N. J.Eq. 498, 78 Atl. 710 (1910).

See Boothe

v. Summit Co., 55 Wash. 167, 173, 104 Pac. 207, 209 (1909) ; 2 Coox,, CORPORATIONs (Sth ed., 1923), § 546.

All cases cited in all notes supra and infra.
).
See Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., 1:29 La. 406, 56 So. 343 (gi
"Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399 (1913); Stanton v.
Baltic
Co., (l9t;).
24o U. S. 103 (1916); Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242
U. S. 5ril
"%.n

Bumbach etc., supra, note 13.

"39 Stat. ;-6, 769 (igj6), U. S. Comp. Stat. (igi8), § 63361[a].

"36 Stat. 112 (i9o9), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1913), § 6301.
"In United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 2w Fed. 803 (S. D. N. Y.,
1912', "depreciation" of property was held to include all ore extracted for the

current year. Cf. Stanton v. ialtic Min. Co., supra, note x3.
"'Leev. Neuchatel, supra, note 6.
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who sustain it," that any of the courts involved in the many cases cited would
not have held differently upon the facts of the instant case. And it is further
submitted that in all but exceptional cases the proper test of the ability to pay
dividends is "whether, after payment and satisfaction of all liabilities, taking
into account the ability to redeem the capital stock at par. there still remains a
fund out of which the proposed dividend can be paid without impairment of the
capital." 2
WILS--CoNsTucrlO -DIsTRIBUTION

PER STmES OR PER CAPITA-The

testator in the second paragraph of his will bequeathed the sum of one dollar to
"the heirs of my beloved daughter deceased." And in the five ensuing paragraphs he made bequests of one dollar to each of his five children by name.
He then provided that the residue of his estate be -equally divided between his
"above-named children, their heirs or assigns, share and share alike." Each
one of the three children of the deceased daughter claimed the right to take
per capita along with the five living children of the testator, that is one-eighth
of the residue. Held: The three grandchildren take per slirpes and not per
capita. Canfield v. Jameson, 2o8 N. W. 369 (Iowa, 1926).
The general rule is that when a devise is made to "heirs," the law presumes the testator's intention to be that the beneficiaries so designated shall take
per stirpes1 On the other hand, "equally to be divided" and "share and share
alike," when used in a will, have been held to indicate a division per capita and
not per stirpes, whether the beneficiaries designated are children and grandchildren, or children and strangers,' though the latter proposition admittedly
yields to an even faint glimpse of a different intention on the part of the testator
in the context The different intention may be determined by ascertaining
whether the will divides the beneficiaries into classes, in which the members of
each take equally with the members of the same class, or establishes but one class
in which each beneficiary takes equally with every other.' It is. submitted that
the following facts point to the division of the children into six classes, the
heirs of each child being members of that particular class and sharing equally
with the other heirs of the same child: first, the testator in a distinct paragraph

made the same legacy to the grandchildren of the deceased daughter that he
made to each one of the five children in the five ensuing paragraphs (though it
might be said that the pu-ely nominal character of the legacies somewhat weak-

"6

FETercnEI, CYc. oF CORP. (1920),

§

3670; 2 MACHEN, MODERN LAw OF

CoRP. (19o8), § 1326; 2 CooK, COR'ORATIONS (8th Ed., 1923), loc. cit., supra,
note i0. But see PALvER, loc. cit., supra, note 8; RErrER, op. cit., supra,
note 3 at 126.
'"Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., and Goodnow v. American Co., supra, note S.
'Welsh v. Wheelock, 242 IIl. 380, go N. E. 295 (igo9); McClench v.
Waldron, 2o4 Mass. 554, 91 N. E. x26 (x9o); Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y.
346, 22 N. E. i5o (1889).
' Smith v. Palmer, 7 Hare, 225 (Ch. 1849); Mclntire v. McIntire, 192 U. S.
116 (1904) ; Priester's Estate, 23 Pa. Super. 386 (i9o3).
'Kling v. Schnellbecker, io7 Iowa, 636, 78 N. W. 673 (8W9).
"Doherty and Hayes v. Grady, io5 Me. 36, ,2 Atl. 869 (igo8).
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ens this contention) ; second, the use of the word "their" in the residuary
clause shows that in referring to "heirs" the testator did not have these particular children in mind; and, finally, the addition of "assigns" as alternate with
"heirs" in "heirs or assigns" could hardly be construed so as to lead to the
conclusion that, if one of the testator's children had "assigned his interest to two
or more persons the mere number of assigns could have affected the proportion
the other legatees would take."' The decision finds further support in Pennsylvania in the doctrine that unless the testator has clearly provided a different
mode of distribution in his will, the law will presume the testator's intention
to have been to dispose of his property in accordance with the policy laid down
by the intestate law.'
'In main case on page 37o, supported by Congreve v. Palmer, 16 Beav. 435
(Ch. 1853).
'Ashburner's Estate, xi5 Pa. 545, 28 Atl. 361 (894).
For provisions of
intestacy see Intestate Act of ipx7, P. L. 429, § 7 [d] 3, Pa. Stat. (z92o)

§ 8362.

